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We consider situations in which a group takes a collective decision by aggregating
individual’s judgments on a set of criteria according to some agreed-upon decision
functions. Assuming the criteria and the decision to be binary, we demonstrate that,
except when the aggregation rule is dictatorial or the decision rule is particularly
simple, such reason-based social choice must violate the Pareto principle at some
proﬁle of individual judgments. In the second part of the paper, the normative
implications of this impossibility result are discussed. We argue that the normative
case for the Pareto Principle is strong in situations of “shared self-interest”, but weak
in situations of “shared responsibility”.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, Pareto principle, discursive dilemma, group
choice, responsibility
JEL Classiﬁcation: D70, D711. INTRODUCTION
A key aspect of the economic conception of the rational decision making is its
outcome orientation which entails a central role of the Pareto criterion: if every agent
prefers one social outcome over another, that outcome is socially superior and should
be brought about. Agreement on outcome choices is good enough whether or not it
is based on an agreement on the substantive reasons for these choices; as evidenced
by the (neo-)classical maxim “De gustibus non est disputandum”, the justiﬁcation
of preferences and decisions by reasons is often viewed as impossible or besides the
point.
By contrast, in the legal and political realms, the ability to support collective de-
cisions by reasons appears to matter a lot: debates play a central role in politics as
do notions of precedent and doctrine in law. Accordingly, in the normative think-
ing on politics in recent years, there has been renewed interest in the possibility of
legitimizing political decisions by achieving a (partial) consensus on the reasons for
these decisions through democratic deliberation (see Habermas (1984,1989), Cohen
(1986,1989), Coleman-Ferejohn (1986) and many others). Likewise, the importance
of arriving at legal decisions for the right reasons has been articulated forcefully in
the recent law and economics literature (Kornhauser-Sager (1986), Chapman (1998)).
Even more recently, these ideas have inspired a still smallish but vital literature on
“judgment aggregation” that ﬁts broadly into the ﬁeld of social choice theory; the
seminal paper is List-Pettit (2002).
The starting point for the present paper is the observation that reason-based social
choice can easily come into conﬂict with the Pareto criterion. Consider, for example,
the following variation on the “Discursive Dilemma”1 which we shall refer to as the
“Dilemma of the Paretian Rational”, or simply Paretian Dilemma for short. Suppose
that a three-member panel of judges in a tort case has to decide whether a defendant
has to pay damages to the plaintiﬀ. Legal doctrine requires that damages are due if
and only if the following three premises are established: 1) the defendant had a duty
to take care, 2) the defendant behaved negligently, 3) his negligence caused damage
to the plaintiﬀ. The pattern of judges’ opinions is given in the following Table:
1Originally, the Discursive Dilemma is due to Kornhauser and Sager (1986) under the name of
"Doctrinal Paradox".
1Judge Duty Negligence Causation Damages
I Yes Yes No No
II No Yes Yes No
III Yes No Yes No
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes \ No ?
Table 1: The Dilemma of the Paretian Rational
The panel has agreed to decide on each premise by majority vote. Given the actual
pattern of opinions, it turns out that a majority agrees with each premise; reasoning
from these premises according to legal doctrine, the panel comes to the conclusion
that, yes, the Plaintiﬀ should be awarded damages, contrary to their unanimous
individual opinions that damages should be denied. There is an element of paradox
here: how can an alternative (here: the awarding of damages) be judged superior
by the group if each agent on his own judges it inferior? Note in particular that if
the judges’ opinions are common knowledge, one cannot justify this reversal on the
basis of superior information possessed by the group, since, by assumption, the group
choice relies on commonly known information only.
In this paper, we shall explore how robust this conﬂict between reason-based choice
and the Pareto principle really is. At ﬁrst sight, the conﬂict seems to depend critically
on the aggregation rule employed: for example, if the outcome decision hinges on
the validity of a conjunction of K diﬀerent premises, the dilemma is overcome by
requiring supermajorities exceeding 1 − 1
K for the acceptance of any premise. With
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of the voters.2 Yet, contrary to what may be suggested by this simple example, in
many other cases the Paretian Dilemma cannot be overcome so easily: as soon as
the decision function becomes a bit more complicated, all well-behaved (anonymous
or non-dictatorial) aggregation rules overturn the unanimous outcome judgment for
some proﬁle of judgments: a “Paretian Rational” (advocate of reason-based social
choice) is then “impossible”.
2It is easy to see how this works: if all premises are accepted by the group under such a rule, this
m e a n st h a ts t r i c t l yl e s st h a n1
3 of the voters reject each premise; by consequence, there must exist
at least one voter who accepts all premises and therefore supports the outcome decision.
2To illustrate the ﬂa v o ro ft h er e s u l t st oc o m e ,s u p p o s et h a tt h eo u t c o m ed e c i s i o n
is positive if and only if at least L out of K criteria are satisﬁed, and assume that
1 <L<K . If the outcome depends on three premises (K =3and L =2 ) , majority
voting on premises is consistent. Yet as soon as the outcome depends on four or
more premises, any non-dictatorial aggregation rule is susceptible to Pareto conﬂicts!
Generalizing this example, the main results of this paper, Theorems 5 and 7, classify
all (monotone) decision functions in terms of their propositional structure according
to which types of Pareto consistent3 aggregation rules they admit. In particular,
we show that whenever the outcome decision is “indecomposable” in that no single
premise is either necessary or suﬃcient for the outcome decision, and whenever that
decision depends on at least ﬁve premises, any non-dictatorial aggregation rule gives
rise to potential Pareto conﬂicts.
In line with the emerging literature on judgment aggregation, we conceptualize
reason-based choice as inference from independently aggregated premise judgments.
This formulation has a variety of applications beyond its original judicial setting. An
example closer to some readers’ own professional experience may be the refereeing of
a paper for a journal. Suppose, for instance, that a journal’s editorial policy deems
a paper acceptable if and only if it is valid, novel, and of signiﬁcant interest. The
paper is evaluated by aggregating the referees’ opinions on each criterion according
to some ﬁxed procedure, for example by majority count. If the conﬁguration of the
referees’ views is isomorphic to that in Table 1, the editor faces a non-trivial decision
as to whether to follow through with the premise-based acceptance of the paper, or
to endorse the referee’s unanimous bottom line rejection.4
T om o v ec l o s e rt oe c o n o m i c sp r o p e r ,t h e“ p a n e l ”m i g h tb eac o m m i t t e eo ft h e
Federal Drug Administration that has to decide on whether to grant a patent for a
new, genetically engineered drug on the basis of whether the drug is safe, eﬀective and
3An aggregation rule is Pareto consistent if there is no proﬁle of judmgents at which a Paretian
Discursive Dilemma arises; see Section 2 for a formal deﬁnition.
4Of course, in reality editors typically play a more active role. On the other hand, the assumption
of a mechanical aggregation procedure may be useful as a benchmark assumption, both in that it
does not seem unreasonable as a default option for editors in practice — and an important part of
the justiﬁcation of their decisions to the paper’s authors —, and to the extent that a more active role
of the editor can be attributed, at least in part, to the diﬃculties of using a mechanical aggregation
procedure.
3ethical (either in terms of the research procedure on which it is based or in terms of the
mechanism of its working). As a variant, this decision may be made by the population
at large, not by an expert panel.5 The point of these examples is ﬁrst to show that
the notion of reason-based choice makes intuitive sense and has practical relevance far
beyond the legal realm, including in contexts within the subject matter of economics
narrowly construed such as the regulation of industries. Second, the examples have
been chosen to suggest that the normative appeal of the Pareto criterion depends on
the context of application, and that it is not obvious when it bites and when not.
We presume that for most readers, this appeal increases as one goes down the list of
examples presented.
Whether or not the Pareto criterion is normatively applicable may in general de-
pend on a number of features of decision situation at hand, for example on whether
or not agents’ judgments are commonly known, whether the agents are assumed to
be “rational” or not, whether the judgments concern beliefs, tastes or values, etc..
Here, we shall not try to settle or analyze this complex issue exhaustively, but hope
to provoke interest in further analysis. Beyond that, we shall argue that the applica-
bility of the Pareto criterion turns in particular on the relation between the agents
and the outcome decision. More speciﬁcally, we shall argue that, under appropriate
conditions, if agents have a, possibly shared, self-interest in the decision, the Pareto
criterion is normatively compelling, while it lacks normative force if agents have a
shared responsibility for the decision.
Both cases arise in settings in which the notion of reason-based group choice seems
relevant. At one end of the spectrum, judicial decision-making is arguably a paradig-
matic situation of shared responsibility; at the other, many political and economic
group decisions must be understood as partly or exclusively driven by self-interest.
The results of this paper imply that, in the latter case, the notion of reason-based
social choice must be revised substantially if it is to remain viable at all.6
Related Literature.–
The Dilemma of the Paretian Rational is related to and goes beyond the original
5In the case of a new drug, this is obviously unrealistic, but it need not be in variants, for instance,
in the case of legalizing marijuana.
6See the discussions at the end of section 4 and subsection 7.1 for elaboration of this point.
4Discursive Dilemma introduced by Kornhauser and Sager (1986). The latter’s ro-
bustness has been demonstrated in a series of impossibility theorems by List-Pettit
(2002), Pauly-van Hees (2003), Dietrich (2004a and 2004b), Nehring-Puppe (2005b),
van Hees (2004) and Dokow-Holzman (2005). These results show the existence of
unavoidable inconsistencies between those social decision procedures that directly ag-
gregate outcome judgments and those that arrive at outcome judgments indirectly by
way of logical inference from the aggregation of judgments on the premises. While
such inconsistencies raise important questions regarding the nature of “good” deci-
sion procedures, they do not seem to be genuinely paradoxical. Indeed, why should
the taking account of the reasons for a collective decision not modify the decision
itself, compared to what that decision would have been taken without regard to these
reasons? According to the Discursive Dilemma, reason-basedness makes a diﬀerence,
but a diﬀerence that a primarily outcome-oriented view may well be able to live with.
By contrast, the conﬂict between premise-based choice and unanimous outcome pref-
erences exhibited in the Dilemma of the Paretian Rational challenges a normatively
fundamental principle. In particular, while the overriding of a majority or superma-
jority of agents may well be normatively defensible in cases in which the agents are
self-interested, the overriding of unanimous outcome preferences is much harder to
justify in such cases, if it can be justiﬁed at all.
The above-mentioned literature on the Discursive Dilemma can be viewed as a spe-
cial case of the general problem of aggregating interdependent binary “valuations”
formulated originally in an insuﬃciently known paper by Wilson (1972) as a general-
ization of Arrow’s preference aggregation problem (Arrow 1963) and pursued further
in papers by Fishburn-Rubinstein (1986), Nehring-Puppe (2002, 2004, 2005)7 and
Dokow-Holzman (2005). The special feature of the above literature on the Discursive
Dilemma is the existence of one binary judgment (the outcome judgment) that is
functionally determined by the others, a feature shared by the present paper. How-
ever, this literature assumes that the outcome judgment is aggregated independently
from the aggregation of the premise judgements. As these determine the outcome
7In these papers, which were motivated by the problem of characterizing strategy-proof voting
rules on restricted preference domains, the aggregation problem was termed “voting by properties”.
5judgment uniquely, the merit of this independence assumption can be questioned.8
Since the present paper assumes only that the logically independent premise judg-
ments are aggregated independently from each other, it is immune to this critique.
While all of the quoted contributions can be viewed as analogues or generalizations of
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the main results of the present paper have no obvious
analogue in the preference aggregation literature.
While the robustness and frequent inescapability of the Paretian Dilemma has not
been recognized before in the literature, Dietrich and List (2004) have explored pos-
sible violations of the Pareto principle as the consequence of using aggregation rules
that delegate the group decision on diﬀerent premises to disjoint sets of “experts”, a
phenomenon akin to Sen’s (1970) “Liberal Paradox”.9 We derive weak conditions for
the occurrence of such an “expert paradox” in section 5, and show that frequently
even the mere diﬀerential weighting of experts across premises leads to Pareto con-
ﬂicts. Of course, in the case of more complex decision functions, the expert paradox is
subsumed by the wholesale impossibility of a Paretian rational asserted by our main
result.
Independently, Mongin (2005) shows the non-existence of non-dictatorial
aggregation rules that are simultaneously consistent for a “rich” set of de-
cision rules with at least three premises; for example, while the Paretian
Dilemma in the case of the conjunctive decision function in Table 1 can
be overcome by adopting a 2/3 supermajority rule, this rule, if applied to
a disjunctive decision function would give rise to Pareto inconsistencies.10
A conclusion similar to Mongin’s is observed here in Section 3. However,
such a conclusion seems both less surprising and much less troubling than
the frequent impossibility of any non-dictatorial Pareto inconsistent ag-
gregation rule for a given group decision function uncovered here: not
only does the group (as imagined in the standard judgment aggregation
scenario) face one decision at a time, it is intuitively also very natural to
adapt the aggregation rule to the nature of the decision problem at hand.
8See Mongin (2005) for a forceful criticism.
9An example isomorphic to Table 1 is independently given in List (2004b) without further analy-
sis.
10I became aware of Mongin’s work after this paper, including the discussion in section 3, had
essentially been completed.
6Finally, a distinction between shared self-interest and shared responsibility with the
intended meaning does not seem to have been proposed before in the economics and
social-choice literatures. Perhaps the closest contribution is Philip Pettit’s “Groups
with Minds of their Own” (Pettit 2001b) who argues for the importance of reason-
based collective choice in the constitution of a distinct group agency.
Outline of the Paper.–
After setting up the framework and notation in Section 2, we characterize in section
3 the class of separable aggregation rules that are Pareto consistent with any given
monotone decision function. This result provides the technical foundation for the
remainder of the analysis. In section 4, we derive the main result of the paper,
the classiﬁcation of decision functions according to which kind of Pareto consistent
aggregation rules they admit. In the following section 5, we use the characterization
of section 3 to study when the use of diﬀerent aggregation rules for diﬀerent premises
leads to Pareto conﬂicts.
We then ask in section 6 whether the Paretian Dilemma is the result (or even
artefact) of the propositional structure of the individual and group judgments. In
cases in which all premise judgments are judgments of belief, the natural alternative
to a propositional framework is a Bayesian one. While this entails both mathematical
and conceptual shifts, we suggest by way of examples that the broad picture does not
seem to change fundamentally, leaving a more deﬁnitive conclusion to future research.
We also point out some interesting connections with the impossibility results in the
literature on Bayesian aggregation starting with Hylland-Zeckhauser (1969).
In section 7, we then turn to the normative implications of our results. We ar-
gue that while in contexts of “shared self-interests”, the normative support for the
Pareto criterion remains strong, it breaks down in contexts of “shared responsibility”.
Section 8 concludes, and the Appendix collects all proofs.
2. FRAMEWORK AND NOTATION
Ag r o u po fn agents i ∈ I is faced with making a binary 1-0- (“Yes”-“No”) decision.
The group has agreed to make this choice on the basis of a set of K ≥ 2 binary decision
7criteria (“premises”) {1,..,K} that will also be denoted simply by K.A judgment
J is a set of premises, with the interpretation that k ∈ J means that premise k
is accepted by the individual or group, while k ∈ K\J means that premise k is
rejected. Individual agent’s judgments are denoted by Ji, the group judgment by JI.
An aggregation rule F :
¡
2K¢I → 2K maps proﬁles of individual judgments (Ji)i∈I




. In turn, the group judgment determines the
group choice via a group decision function Φ :2 K → {0,1}. The composition Φ ◦ F
describes a “social choice function” that maps proﬁles of individual judgments to ﬁnal
outcomes. Throughout and w.l.o.g., all premises are assumed to be essential: that is,
for all k ∈ K, there exists J ∈ 2K such that Φ(J)=0and Φ(J ∪ {k})=1 .







agrees with the unanimous outcome choice of the indi-
viduals. Aggregation rules F that ensure such agreement at all proﬁles (Ji)i∈I will
be called Pareto consistent with the decision function Φ.














1 whenever Φ(F (Ji)) = 1 for all i ∈ I.
Note that, in order to interpret an overriding of agents’ unanimous outcome judg-
ments Φ(F (Ji)) as a genuine violation of the Pareto principle, agents must be as-
sumed to care about the group decision on outcomes only. In scenarios in which the
agents care directly about the group decision on the premises as well, this interpre-
tation would cease to be appropriate; for example, in a juridical context, individ-
ual judges may care about the precedent set by the group decision on a particular
premise.11 In such cases, there may well be a trade-oﬀ between respecting agents’
outcome judgments versus respecting their premise judgments, and an overriding of
even a unanimous outcome judgment may well be Pareto eﬃcient.
Throughout, we will assume that the group judgments on diﬀerent premises are
determined independently; that is, there exists a family of premise-wise aggregation
11Note, however, that the interest in precedents can be attributed to an interest in future outcome
judgments; this apparent counterexample to the Pareto interpretation of Deﬁntion 1 would thus
cease to apply in a richer context in which future outcome decisions are explicitly modeled.





= {k ≤ K : Fk ({i ∈ I : Ji 3 k})=1 };
such F will be called separable. In many contexts, separability will be compelling
due to the logical independence of the premises; in the literature on judgment aggre-
gation, separable rules are also referred to as “premise-centered” aggregation rules.
Throughout, and wrapped into the notion of separability, we will assume that each
Fk is monotone, i.e. Fk (W)=1and W0 ⊇ W imply Fk (W0)=1, and respects
unanimity, i.e. Fk (∅)=∅ and Fk (I)=1 .
It is convenient to represent a rule Fk in terms of its families of “winning coalitions”
Wk := F
−1
k (1), and to write F =( Wk)k≤K. It is also often useful to consider the
set of coalitions that are winning for the negation of ak W0
k := {W : Wc ∈ F
−1
k (0)};
these are the sets of agents whose rejection of ak entails a rejection of ak by the group.
In the important special case of anonymous rules, these rules can be parametrized in
terms of a vector of quotas (qk) as (Wqk) by deﬁning, for any q ∈ [0,1], Wq := {W ∈
2I :# W>q nor #W = n and q =1 }. For example, proposition-wise majority voting
is deﬁned for an odd number of agents by setting Wk = W1
2 for all k.
Representing Judgments and Decision Functions by Propositions.–
Intuition is aided greatly by interpreting judgments and decision functions as propo-
sitions. This involves a certain amount of technical detail for now, but will pay oﬀ
substantially later on. Thus, associate with each premise k ∈ K an atomic proposi-
tion ak, and let Π denote the set of all complex propositions built from the atomic
propositions {a1,...,a K} through the logical connectives “and”, “or”, “not” denoted














recording the aﬃrmation of all accepted and the negation of all rejected premises. In
the converse direction, any complex proposition π ∈ Π describes a unique set of judg-
ments J (π) ∈ 2(2K) in the obvious way. Formally, J (π) is pinned down by the follow-
9ing three stipulations: i) J ({ak})={J ∈ 2K : J 3 k}, ii) J (π ∧ π0)=J (π)∩J (π0),
and iii) J (¬π)=J (π)
c . For example, with K =3 , one has J (a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3)={J ∈
2K : J 3 a1,J 3 a2, and J 3 a3} = {{a1,a 2,a 3}}; more generally, these stipulations
imply that J (πJ)={J} for any judgment J ∈ 2K. Note also the following two
straightforward facts: ﬁrst, any set of judgments J ∈ 2(2K) is described by some
proposition; that is, for any J ∈ 2(2K), there exists π ∈ Π such that J = J (π).
Second, complex propositions describe the same set of judgments if and only if they
are equivalent; that is, J (π)=J (π0) for any π,π0 ∈ Π if and only if π is logically
equivalent to π0.
The propositional characterization of sets of judgments will be used in particular
to characterize the “acceptance region” J + := Φ−1 (1) and the “rejection region”
J − := Φ−1 (0) associated with a decision function Φ; these two regions denote the
sets of all judgments leading to positive and negative outcome decisions, respectively.
For example, the acceptance region of the decision function Φ2,3 on 23 deﬁned by
Φ2,3 (J)=1if and only if #J ≥ 2 can be described by the proposition (a1 ∧ a2) ∨
(a1 ∧ a3) ∨ (a2 ∧ a3), which simply says that at least two premises are accepted.
Monotone Decision Functions.–
As a matter of signiﬁcant technical and expositional simpliﬁcation, we will maintain
the assumption that the group decision function Φ is monotone in the sense that
Φ(J)=1and J0 ⊇ J imply Φ(J0)=1 ; intuitively, a decision function is monotone
if the the acceptance of any premise never reverses a positive decision. Much of
the analytical beneﬁt of focusing on monotone decision functions derives from the
existence of the following canonical propositional representation as a disjunction of
conjunctions that is directly useful in the study of Pareto consistency.
To this behalf, let min J + denote the family of inclusion-minimal judgments in J +,
and write min J + = {J+
m}m∈M+ for an appropriate index set M+; similarly, let max
J − = {J−
m}m∈M− denote the family of inclusion-maximal judgments in J − for an
appropriate index set M−. Clearly, if the underlying decision function is monotone,
aj u d g m e n tJ belongs to the acceptance region J + i fa n do n l yi fi tc o n t a i n ss o m e
judgment J0 ∈ min J +. The acceptance region J + associated with any monotone













that is, J (πΦ)=J +, with πΦ being the unique disjunction of conjunctions of atomic
propositions π such that J (π)=J +.12
Similarly, the rejection region J − is described by the negation ¬πΦ; in turn, ¬πΦ is
















In the example of the decision function Φ2,3 introduced above, (2) is given by (¬a1 ∧ ¬a2)∨
(¬a1 ∧ ¬a3) ∨ (¬a2 ∧ ¬a3):the outcome decision is negative if and only if at least
two of the three premises are rejected.
Since a decision rule Φ is uniquely characterized by the canonical representation
πΦ of its acceptance region given by (1), we will use the symbol Φ to refer to both
the decision function and the proposition πΦ characterizing it. Likewise, we will use
the symbol ¬Φ for the canonical representation (2) of the rejection region J −. It is
very natural to think of a decision function in propostional terms, since a judgment
J leads to a positive outcome decision if and only if the decision proposition πΦ is
logically entailed by the judgment proposition πJ.
Monotonicity seems plausible for many applications. Consider, for example, the case
of a tenuring decision. The decision function Φ is the agreed upon tenuring standard.
Each premise can be viewed as a “Lancasterian characteristic” of the candidate’s
record; monotonicity assumes that characteristics are unambiguously desirable or
undesirable. The conjunctions in (1) represent the minimal combinations of desirable
characteristics that warrant tenure. The disjunction operator captures the fact that
some characteristics can substitute for others; for example excellence in teaching can
12If one lets Πmon denote the class of all complex propositions that are logically equivalent to
a disjunction of conjunctions of atomic propositions as in (1). Clearly, any π ∈ Πmon deﬁnes
a monotone decision rule with acceptance region J (π).T h u s , Πmon is the class of propositions
associated with some monotone decision rule. It is also the smallest class of propositions containing
the atomic propositions and closed under conjunction, disjunction, and logical equivalence.
11make up for a narrow research record. In any case, the assumption of monotonicity is
made for analytical and technical convenience only. The central tool of the analysis,
the Pareto Intersection Property stated in Proposition 2, would remain applicable in
modiﬁed form, and the overall drift of the results would likely remain the same; if
anything, the balance would further tilt toward impossibility.
3. PARETO CONSISTENT AGGREGATION RULES:
CHARACTERIZATION
The following result characterizes the class of separable aggregation rules that are
Pareto consistent with it any given decision function Φ.
Proposition 2 (Pareto Intersection Property) The separable aggregation rule
F =( Wk) is Pareto consistent with the monotone decision function Φ if and only if
it satisﬁes the following pair of conditions:
i) For any J ∈ minJ + and any selection Wk ∈ Wk for k ∈ J, ∩k∈JWk 6= ∅.
ii) For any J ∈ maxJ − and any selection Wk ∈ W0
k for k ∈ Jc, ∩k∈JcWk 6= ∅.
The idea behind the proof of Proposition 2 is the following. Pareto consistency
amounts to the requirement that judgment proﬁles that are wholly contained in the
acceptance region J + (respectively the rejection region J −) map to a collective judg-
ment in the same region. Thus, the characterization of Pareto consistent separable
aggregation rules can be deduced from the characterization of separable aggregation
rules on restricted domains of ‘feasible’ judgments D (= J +,J −). Such a character-
ization has been provided in Nehring-Puppe 2004 (henceforth simply NP) in terms
of an “Intersection Property” which captures the combinatorial structure of the do-
main D in terms of its “critical families”; to these correspond here the elements of
the sets minJ + and maxJ −, which will be referred to as “critical judgments”. In
view of (1) and (2), these can be read oﬀ immediately from the canonical disjunctive
representation of Φ and its negation.
In the anonymous case, the Pareto Intersection Property (henceforth: PIP) takes a
particularly simple form in that the set of Pareto consistent rules can be characterized
by a system of linear inequalities; for details, see NP, section 3.3.
12Fact 3 (Anonymous Pareto Intersection Property) If (Wk) is anonymous
and Pareto consistent with the monotone decision function Φ, there exists a system
of quotas (qk) such that
i) Wk = Wqk for all k ≤ K,
ii) for any J ∈ minJ +,
P
k∈J qk ≥ #J − 1,
iii) for any J ∈ maxJ −,
P
k∈Jc qk ≤ 1,
iv) for all H ∈ H,n q k is not an integer other than 0 or n.
Conversely, if (qk) is a vector of quotas satisfying ii), iii) and iv), the aggregation
rule (Wqk) is anonymous and Pareto consistent.
The conditions ii) and iii) are the counterparts to the two set-theoretic conditions
making up the PIP. The role of condition iv) is to ensure that the dual committees W0
qk
are equal to the committees W1−qk; this becomes important in situations in which all
anonymous choice-functions require some quota qk to be equal to 1
2; clause iv) implies
in this case that n must be odd. This makes intuitive sense in that majority voting
is well-deﬁned only for an odd number of individuals.
To see how the PIP works in the anonymous case, consider a system of quotas (qk)
violating part iii) of Fact 3, and consider a critical judgment J ∈ maxJ − such that
P
k∈J
c qk > 1. For k ∈ J
c




consider any proﬁle (Ji) such that exactly the fraction µk of agents has the judgment
J ∪ {k}.13 By choice of J, each judgment of the form J ∪ {k} is in the acceptance
region J +; hence, at the deﬁned proﬁle, the group favors unanimously a positive
outcome decision. On the other hand, each premise k ∈ J
c
i sf a v o r e db yo n l yt h e
fraction µk of agents, which is not enough to reach the quota qk; hence each premise
k ∈ J
c
is rejected by the group, and only the premises in J are accepted. But since J
is in the rejection region J −, the group reaches a negative outcome decision, violating
Pareto consistency.
To further illustrate the content and power of the Pareto Intersection Property,
consider ﬁrst the simplest example in which Φ is the conjunction of K atomic propo-
13The meticulous reader will note that this explanation appeals to an appropriately chosen number
of agents n, while Fact 3 is valid for any ﬁxed n.
13sitions. Here the PIP requires that
X
k≤K
qk ≥ K − 1.
This means that, in particular, a strict supermajority rule with uniform supermajority
qk = q is Pareto consistent if and only if




More generally, consider the class of decision functions ΦL,K equivalent to the satis-
faction of at least L out of K atomic propositions (criteria). The critical jugments in
minJ + are exactly the judgments of cardinality L. Similarly, the critical jugments
in maxJ − are exactly the judgments of cardinality L − 1; their complements have
thus cardinality K − L +1 . T h eP I Pt h e r e f o r er e q u i r e st h a t
X
k∈J
qk ≥ L − 1,
for all J with #J = L, and X
k∈Jc
qk ≤ 1
















K − L +1
, (4)






K − L +1
,
i.e. iﬀ L =1 ,L= K, or L =2and K =3 . In particular, if K ≥ 4 and 1 <L<K ,
all anonymous aggregation rules are Pareto inconsistent. According to Theorem 7
14below, this conclusion extends to all non-dictatorial aggregation rules.
This class of examples also shows that the set of Pareto consistent aggregation rules
depends heavily on the decision function Φ, if it is non-degenerate at all. Indeed,
for the system of quotas (qk) to simultaneously be Pareto consistent with both the
complete conjunction and the complete disjunction of K premises, the quotas need
to satisfy X
k≤K




this is possible at all only if K =2 ! 14
4. PARETO CONSISTENT AGGREGATION RULES: EXISTENCE
Rather than considering one decision function at a time, we now take a broader view
and classify decision functions according to the kind of Pareto-consistent aggregation
rules they admit. Along with anonymity, we will consider the following properties:
dictatorship, local dictatorship, veto power, and neutrality. These are most crisply
deﬁned in terms of the winning coalitions characterizing separable aggregation rules.
Deﬁnition 4 1. A separable aggregation rule F =( Wk)k∈K is dictatorial if there
exists an individual i ∈ I such that {i} ∈ Wk ∩ W0
k for all k ≤ K;
2. F is locally dictatorial if there exists an individual i ∈ I and a premise ak
such that {i} ∈ Wk ∩ W0
k;
3. F exhibits veto power if there exists an individual i ∈ I and a premise ak such
that {i} ∈ Wk ∪ W0
k;
4. F is neutral if, for all premises ak and a , Wk = W  = W0
 .
Thus, neutrality requires both that the winning coalitions for any premise are the
same as those for its complement, and that these winning coalitions are identical
across premises. Clearly, in the anonymous case, neutrality amounts to majority
14Using the Pareto Intersection Property, this can be generalized to show that if the
same (possibly non-anonymous) aggregation rule is Pareto consistent with the both the
disjunction and the conjunction of the same three premises, it must be dictatorial; a
similar result has recently been obtained independently by Mongin (2005).
15voting on each premise; as remarked above, for this to be well-deﬁned, the number
of individuals must be odd. Note that, by contrast, non-anonymous and neutral
aggregation rules exist even if the number of individuals is even. Also note that an
aggregation rule exhibits no veto power if and only if any premise is accepted/rejected
whenever at least n − 1 individuals accept/reject it.
The existence of a possibility result depends on the complexity and structure of
the group decision function Φ. The complexity of the group decision function can be











Decision rules with the smallest complexity measure κΦ =2will be called simple;
they turn out to be exactly the decision functions for which majority voting on prop-
erties is Pareto consistent.
Theorem 5 The following four statements are equivalent:
1. Majority voting on properties is Pareto consistent with Φ;
2. There exists a neutral and non-dictatorial separable aggregation rule that is
Pareto consistent with Φ;
3. Φ is simple (κΦ =2 ) ;
4. Φ has one of the following three forms, where a,b,c,d are not necessarily dis-
tinct:
Φ = ab ∨ cd, or
Φ = ab ∨ cd ∨ bc, or
Φ = ab ∨ cd ∨ bc ∨ ad.
To illustrate the equivalence between the third and fourth statements, Φ = ab∨cd
has complexity κΦ =2since ¬Φ ⇐⇒ ac∨ad∨bc∨bd.15 By contrast, Φ = ab∨cd∨e
15Recall the deﬁnition of ¬Φ in section 2. To compactify notation of speciﬁcp r o p o s i t i o n s ,w e
frequently denote the negation of an atomic proposition by a instead of ¬a, and abbreviate a con-
16has κΦ =3since ¬Φ has the canonical representation ¬Φ ⇐⇒ ace ∨ ade ∨ bce ∨ bde.
By Theorem 5, majority voting is Pareto consistent only in very special circum-
stances. Yet as illustrated by the example of conjunctive and disjunctive decision
functions, Pareto consistency can sometimes be achieved by appropriate supermajor-
ity rules that treat a premise and its negation asymmetrically; whether or not this is
possible more generally depends on the qualitative structure of the decision function,
as will be shown now. We will distinguish three types of decision functions — “inde-
composable”, “fully decomposable” and “partly decomposable”— and consider them
in turn.
The decision function/proposition Φ is indecomposable if no premise is by itself
either necessary or suﬃcient for the satisfaction of Φ. Formally, Φ is indecomposable
if each conjunct of the canonical representations of both Φ and ¬Φ combines at least
two premises. For example, among the family of propositions ΦL,K described above,
ΦL,K is indecomposable if and only if 1 <L<K .
To complete the picture, we need to consider intermediate cases between those of
simple conjunctions/disjunctions on the one hand and indecomposable ones on the
other. Suppose thus that Φ is decomposable (not indecomposable). We note the
following elementary fact.
Fact 6 A monotone proposition Φ is decomposable if and only if there exists a premise
ak and a monotone proposition Φ0 with n − 1 arguments such that
Φ(a1,...,an)=Φ
0(a1,..,a k−1,a k+1,..,an) ∨ ak
or
Φ(a1,...,an)=Φ
0(a1,..,ak−1,a k+1,..,an) ∧ ak.
If the monotone proposition Φ0 described by this Fact is in turn decomposable,
one is able to further simplify the representation of Φ by peeling oﬀ further premises
until one arrives at an indecomposable proposition Φ∗ o rh a su s e du pa l la r g u m e n t s ,
in which case Φ∗ can be viewed as “empty”. It is easy to see that Φ∗ is uniquely
junction such as a ∧ b∧ ca sabc.
17deﬁned.16 We will refer to Φ∗ as the “core” of Φ. I ft h ec o r ei se m p t y ,Φ is fully
decomposable;i ft h ec o r eΦ∗ is non-empty but Φ is decomposable, then Φ is partly
decomposable.
Theorem 7 i) If Φ is monotone and indecomposable, it admits a non-dictatorial
and Pareto consistent separable aggregation rule F if and only if Φ is simple. If Φ
is simple, then a separable aggregation rule F is Pareto consistent if and only if it is
neutral.
ii) If Φ is monotone and fully decomposable, then it admits an anonymous separable
aggregation rule without veto power that is Pareto consistent.
iii) If Φ is monotone and partly decomposable with a simple core, then it admits an
anonymous separable aggregation rule that is Pareto consistent.
On the other hand, all Pareto consistent separable aggregation rules exhibit
veto power.
iv) If Φ is monotone and partly decomposable with a non-simple core, then it admits
a non-dictatorial separable aggregation rule that is Pareto consistent.
On the other hand, all Pareto consistent separable aggregation rules are locally
dictatorial.
Corollary 8 If Φ is monotone, then it admits an anonymous Pareto consistent sep-
arable aggregation rule F if and only if its core Φ∗ is empty or simple.
The key step to proving the ﬁrst part of the Theorem is to show that in the inde-
composable case any Pareto consistent aggregation rule must be neutral; by Theorem
16Formally, one arrives at a uniquely deﬁned “canonical decomposition” of Φ of the following form,



























where Φ∗ is indecomposable or empty (iﬀ km =1 ) ,w i t hm ≥ 0 and K +1≥ k0 ≥ k1 ≥ k2 ≥
...km−1 ≥ km − 1 ≥ 0.
In this notation, Φ is indecomposable if m =0and k0 = K. Also, if Φ is partly composable
and k1 = k0 = K +1 , this means that the leading disjuctive term is empty, and that therefore
the expression for Φ starts properly with a disjunctive term; similarly, if km−1 = km − 1, the last
disjunctive term is empty.
185a b o v e ,Φ must therefore be simple; conversely, as we know again from Theorem 5,
for simple Φ, neutrality ensures Pareto consistency.
The proof of part ii) of Theorem 7 is non-trivial due to the fact that the quotas
qk associated with the speciﬁed aggregation rules may need to be non-constant, i.e.
there may not exist q : 1
2 ≤ q<1 such that qk ∈ {q,1 − q}. This happens, for
example, for the decision function Φ = f ∨ e ∨ (d ∧ (c ∨ ba)). Indeed, in such cases
the required supermajorities may be more extreme than a straightforward analogy to
pure con- or disjunctions would suggest. In the example Φ = f ∨ e ∨ (d ∧ (c ∨ ba)),
the least extreme supermajority maxk max(qk,1 − qk) must be at least 9
10, 17 while
a conjunction of 6 premises would require a uniform supermajority of only 5
6 to be
Pareto consistent.
To illustrate why partial decomposability entails a veto as asserted in part iii),
consider the partly decomposable decision function Φ = a∨bc∨bd∨cd. Suppose that
F is an anonymous, Pareto consistent separable aggregation rule. From part i) of
the Theorem, it is clear that F must require majority voting over the core premises
b,c, and d. Consider the following proﬁle of judgments among n =2 m +1agents:
m agents hold the judgment abcd, another m agents hold the judgment abcd, and a
single agent i holds the judgment abcd. In particular, all agents aﬃrm Φ.O n t h e
other hand, a majority rejects each of the three core-premises b,c, and d. Thus, for
the group to aﬃrm Φ as required by Pareto consistency, it must aﬃrm a. But since i
is the only agent aﬃrming a, this means that i must have a veto against rejecting a.
The assumptions behind Theorems 5 and 7 are special in a number of ways whose
relaxation would not substantially alter the upshot of these results. First, if one would
drop the monotonicity assumption on the decision function Φ, the logic of the analysis
would remain the same; the PIP would simply have to be formulated in a more general
way. However, the analysis would become substantially more complicated and most
likely more messy due to the absence of a canonical propositional representation.
Nonetheless, the thrust of the results, i.e. the conﬁnement of possibility results to
decision functions with quite special and simple structure, would in all likelihood
remain the same; if anything, in the absence of monotonicity, the balance would
17This is achieved by the following quotas obtained by Linear Programming: qf = qe =0 .1,
qd =0 .8,q c =0 .2,q a = qb =0 .6 .
19probably tilt even further towards Pareto inconsistency, in that it will frequently be
impossible to ensure even one-sided respect for unanimity on positive (or negative)
outcome decisions only.
Second, we have assumed that the outcome decision can take on two values only.
If the outcome decision is multiple-valued (with Φ : J 7→ y ∈ Y ),t h ew e a k e s t
natural notion of Pareto consistency requires that if all agents agree on some outcome
decision (which can thus be viewed as implicitly the unanimously “most preferred”),
the group choice must agree with this decision. Under this deﬁnition, the role of the
sets J − and J + is now taken by the partition of {0,1}K into the inverse images
Jy := Φ−1(y), with y ∈ Y . On the one hand, multi-valuedness leads to additional
ﬂexibility in chopping up the domain of the decision function in appropriate pieces;
in the extreme case in which the J 0
ys are all singletons, Pareto consistency loses its
bite. On the other hand, with more than two outcome decisions in the range of Φ, at
least one region must be non-monotonic, which will typically make it hard for Pareto
consistency to be satisﬁed. For example, if the decision function Φ : J 7→ {0,...,#K}
is given by Φ(J)=# J, non-dictatorial Pareto consistent aggregation is possible only
if #K ≤ 2.18 Generalizing this example, it seems likely that the second eﬀect of
multi-valuedness will dominate in most applications.
Third, we have assumed a universal domain of premise judgments in the sense
that any combination of premise judgments is allowed. If certain combinations of
premise judgments are excluded, for example due to logical or semantic entailment
relations, this complicates the exact characterization of the possibilities but leaves the
broad picture intact. Roughly speaking, if the entailment structure among premises
is such that the space of judgments is two-dimensional (i.e. can be embedded in the
product of two trees in an appropriate sense, cf. Nehring-Puppe 2003), possibility
results predominate. On the other hand, as soon as the space of judgments is at least
three-dimensional, possibility results will obtain only in fairly special and restrictive
circumstances.19
18This follows from the fact that if #K>2, the sets Jy for 1 ≤ y ≤ #K−1 are totally blocked; due
to Theorem 1 of Nehring-Puppe (2005a), this implies that the aggregation rule must be dictatorial.
19To be a bit more precise and speciﬁc, consider the case of majority voting on interrelated
premises. For this to be consistent, the space of judgments must be a median space; see NP,
Theorem 4. For majority voting on premises to be Pareto-consistent in addition, the sets J + and
J − must themselves be median-spaces. This is easily possible in the case of at most two dimensions,
20In all of this, we have maintained the assumption that the premise judgments are
to be aggregated independently (“separability”). In view of the assumed logical in-
dependence of the premises, this assumption will be plausible in many applications.
(This is in marked contrast with the original Discursive Dilemma, where the norma-
tive appeal of aggregating outcome judgements independently from the judgments on
the premises that determine the outcome truth-functionally can be questioned). Sep-
arability is especially plausible if the judgments on diﬀerent premises are epistemically
independent in that the relevant evidential considerations behind these judgments are
independent.20 For instance, epistemic independence seems highly plausible in the
introductory adjudication example of Table 1, where the evidence germane to the
three issues of duty, negligence, and causation is clearly quite distinct.
Of course, if one is willing to give up separability, it is possible to ﬁnd rules that
satisfy Pareto consistency. One such class of rules are the “maxmin rules” deﬁned as
follows. Let K0={1,..,K,K+1} denote the set of all judged propositions comprising
a l lp r e m i s e sa n dt h ec o n c l u s i o na st h eK +1-th proposition. For any judgment J,l e t





J ∪ {K +1 } if Φ(J)=1
.
For any k ∈ K0, let sk,J denote the support for judging k according to J, i.e.
sk,J =
(
#{i : k ∈ J0
i} if k ∈ J 3 k
#{i : k/ ∈ J0
i} if k/ ∈ J
.
An aggregation rule F is a maxmin rule if it maximizes the weakest support, i.e. if












but only in special and restricted ways otherwise.
20One way to make the notion of epistemic independence more rigorous formally would be to
postulate a setting in which the aggregated premises judgments are themselves determined truth-
functionally by judgments about “basic” premises; in this setting, epistemic independence could be
equated with disjointness of the basic premises determining each aggregated premise.
21Maxmin rules are the analogue of maxmin (Simpson-Kramer) rules in the context of
preference aggregation. As in that context, maxmin rules are Condorcet consistent;
that is, they agree with proposition-wise majority voting whenever this is consistent.
More importantly for the present discussion, they are Pareto-consistent as well, for
any proposition Φ, since for any group judgment in violation of a unanimous judgment
on any proposition, premise or conclusion, its minimal support mink∈K0 sk,J equals 0,
while the minimal support of any individual’s judgment mink∈K0 sk,Ji is at least 1.
However, the maxmin rule’s violation of separability entails potentially problematic
spill-overs across premises. Consider, for instance, the following proﬁle of judgments
of a 7-member panel in the adjudication of a tort claim based on two conjunctive
premises.
Judge Duty Negligence Damages
I,II Yes Yes Yes
III,IV No Yes No
V,VI,VII Yes No No
Majority Yes Yes No
Minimax Yes No No
and
Judge Duty Negligence Damages
I,II Yes Yes Yes
III,IV No Yes No
V Yes No No
VI,VII No No No
Majority No Yes No
Minimax No Yes No
Table 2: The Maxmin Rule at two proﬁles
G i v e nt h et o pp r o ﬁle of preferences displayed, majority voting on premises entails
a negative outcome decision; since this agrees with the outcome decision preferred
a majority of judges, it also the maxmin outcome decision. Suppose, though, that
22judges VI and VII reconsider, and come to the conclusion that the defendant did
have a duty to take care, after all. While the 5:2 majority view on outcomes remains
unchanged, now a 5:2 majority of judges aﬃr m saf a i l u r eo fD u t y .T h em a x m i nr u l e
breaks the inconsistency of propositionswise majority voting at its weakest link, which
is the 4:3 majority in favor of Negligence.
Thus, the group judgment on Negligence has changed even though all of the judges
views on this issue remain unchanged. Whether or not such ripple eﬀects are deemed
acceptable will depend on the context. In the adjudication example, this seems quite
problematic, in that for an outcome judgment to be well-justiﬁed by group judgments
on the underlying premises, these group judgments presumably should be grounded
in the individual’s judgments on that issue, or at least some epistemically related one.
Since the judges views on the issue Duty have no plausible evidential bearing on the
issue of Negligence, one feels that the maxmin judgment on Negligence at the second
proﬁle is merely a post-hoc rationalization (in the ordinary language, pejorative sense)
of the maintained negative outcome decision on Damages.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the maxmin rule is a rather special in sat-
isfying Pareto consistency almost by construction. In general, natural non-separable
aggregation rules may easily violate Pareto consistency; for example, if the group
judgment is aggregated by maximizing the total support
P
k∈K0 sk,J rather than the
minimal support (in analogy to the Kemeny or “median” rule for preference max-
imization), one can show that, depending on the nature of the monotone decision
function, Pareto consistency may or may not hold. Thus, if Pareto consistency is
deemed normatively inviolable, and if separability is abandoned for that reason, it
would likely constitute a rather powerful criterion for selecting among non-separable
aggregation rules. Obviously, this constitutes an interesting and potentially rich ﬁeld
for future investigations.
5. JUDGMENT DELEGATION TO EXPERTS
In the above analysis, we have related the existence and properties of Pareto consis-
tent separable aggregation rules to the structure of the decision function Φ. We shall
now show that Pareto consistency also imposes substantial restrictions on aggregation
23rules that do not depend on the structure of the decision function. Broadly speaking,
the aggregation rules governing diﬀerent premises must be “suﬃciently similar” to
each other to ensure Pareto consistency.
Dissimilarity in this sense originates in particular from the delegation of the judg-
ments on various premises to distinct subgroups of “experts”, as illustrated by the
following example due to Dietrich and List (2004) who point out its formal analogy
to Sen’s (1970) “Liberal Paradox”.
Example 9 Let Φ = a ∧ b and I = {1,2}, and assume that agent 1 decides a and
agent 2 decides b (that is, {1} ∈ Wa ∩ W0
a and {2} ∈ Wb ∩ W0
b). Suppose that
J1 = {a} and J2 = {b}. Then both agents reject Φ; nonetheless, since both aﬃrm the
premises they are authorized to judge, F (J1,J 2)={a,b}; the group therefore accepts
Φ, a Pareto inconsistency.
The general point contained in the example is that the sets of agents that have
decisive inﬂuence on the group choice of a premise must always overlap. Formally,
for k ≤ K, deﬁne the family of decisive coalitions Dk := Wk ∩ W0
k.
Theorem 10 For any monotone Φ and any F that is Pareto-consistent with Φ :
for all j,k ≤ K and all W ∈ Dj,W
0 ∈ Dk : W ∩ W
0 6= ∅.
T h e o r e m1 0h a st w om o r es p e c i ﬁc corollaries. For any k, let Ek denote the set
of “essential agents” or “experts” whose judgment counts in the group judgment on
premise k : Ek := {i ∈ I : there exists W ∈ Wc
k such that W ∪ {i} ∈ Wk}. Note that
Ek ∈ Dk by deﬁnition. Thus we have
Corollary 11 For any monotone Φ and any Pareto-consistent F :
for all j,k ∈ K : Ej ∩ Ek 6= ∅. (5)
Thus, generalizing Example 9 above, whenever two premises are eﬀectively judged
by disjoint sets of experts, a potential Pareto inconsistency arises.
M o r ec a nb es a i di fm o r ei sk n o w na b o u tt h es t r u c t u r eo ft h ea g g r e g a t i o nr u l e so n
the individual premises. Suppose in particular that the aggregation rule F =( Wk) is
24premise-wise neutral in the sense that the acceptance and rejection of each premise
is treated symmetrically, i.e., for all k ≤ K, Wk = W0
k. For example, F is premise-wise
neutral if each premise is judged by weighted majority voting, where individual agents’
weights may diﬀer across premises. Indeed, in this case, the aggregation rules used
for the diﬀerent premises must be identical for Pareto consistency to obtain; there is
no room at all for a diﬀerential weighting of agents according to their expertise!21
Proposition 12 If the separable aggregation rule F =( Wk) is premise-wise neutral
a n dP a r e t oc o n s i s t e n t ,i ti sn e u t r a l .
A result with a drift similar to that of Corollary 11 has been obtained before by
Dietrich and List (2004). Corollary 11 goes beyond their results by deriving the
necessary overlap of experts from a condition that is explicitly formulated in terms
of the structure of the proposition Φ (monotonicity) rather than implicitly as in
their “connectedness”; moreover, since not all monotone propositions are connected,
Corollary 11 cannot be derived from their result.22 Dietrich and List (2004) have no
counterpart to the more general Theorem 10 or to Proposition 12.23
6. ALTERNATIVE LOGICS OF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION
As pointed out at the end of section 4, the thrust of our results is robust to the
particular assumptions made: the monotonicity assumption on the decision function,
the binary accept-or-reject character of the group decision, and the logical indepen-
dence of premises. Nonetheless, all of these variations maintain the propositional,
hence discrete, structure of individual and group judgments that is the hallmark of
the existing literature on judgment aggregation. It is thus natural to wonder whether
21Besides its intrinsic interest, Proposition 12 is a key step in proving that when Φ is indecom-
posable, Pareto consistency requires neutrality, as asserted by part i) of Theorem 7 above.
22An example of a monotone but not connected proposition is Φ = abc ∨ abd ∨ ace ∨ bcf; by
Lemma 17 in the Appendix, ¬Φ = ab ∨ ac ∨ bc ∨ af ∨ be ∨ cd. Φ is not connected, because none of
the conjuncts making up Φ (resp. ¬Φ) contains both d and e (resp. both d and e).C o n v e r s e l y ,n o t
all connected propositions are monotone.
23On the other hand, Dietrich and List (2004) obtain results that have no counterpart here.
25the “Impossibility of a Paretian Rational” is derived more from that propositional
structure rather than from reason-basedness itself.
In particular, one may argue that even though individual judgments may plausibly
be modelled as propositional, it may be artiﬁcial to force social judgments into the
same all-or-nothing mold when agents disagree. Such disagreement could reasonably
give rise to an element of doubt that should be reﬂected in intermediate degrees of
acceptance or “truth”. Thus Pauly-van Hees (2003) and van Hees (2004) study the
Discursive Dilemma in the context of multi-valued logic. In Appendix 1, we show that
under standard interpretations of the logical connectives “and” and “or”, allowing
for multi-valuedness leaves the set of rationalizable social choice functions completely
unchanged and hence does nothing to mitigate the conﬂict between reason-basedness
and Pareto consistency.
In those cases in which all premise judgments represent beliefs, one may want to
depart even further from the propositional setting and assume that all judgments come
in the form of probabilities. While a complete and fully satisfactory understanding
of the Bayesian version is beyond the scope of the present paper, we shall argue that
conﬂicts between reason-basedness and the Pareto principle arise again naturally and
take a broadly similar shape. Assuming stochastic independence of the aggregated
events, the following model is formulated in a rather special way to make the analogy
to the propositional set-up as tight as possible. It is not meant as an exhaustive
discussion of the issues arising in a Bayesian setting.24
To arrive at the Bayesian counterpart, suppose now that a group decision is to
be taken on the basis of individual agent’s probability judgments pk
i on K sub-
jectively stochastically independent contingencies Ek. Thus each agent’s beliefs pi
are described by a product measure ⊗kpk
i on the state space {0,1}K, with Ek =
{1}×{ 0,1}K\k, where pk
i is uniquely speciﬁed by the number pk
i = pk
i(Ek), the
subjective probability of agent i that the k − th contingency Ek materializes. The
individual assessments are aggregated by a separable aggregation rule H =( Hk) into
24Much of the specialness of the following formulation is more apparent than real. In particular,
the basic points of the following discussion would easily generalize to conditional independence
structures. As demonstrated by the explosive growth of “Bayes’ nets” and “graphical models” in
Bayesian theory and applications over the last 15 years, these are of extremely wide applicabilty and
fundamental importance; see, for example, Pearl (1988) and Cowell et al. (1999).
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viewing Hk as a mapping from [0,1]I to [0,1].
Again, the group needs to make a Yes-No-decision on the basis of the aggregated
group probabilities. In a Bayesian setting, it is natural to assume that the group
uses an expected utility criterion described by an agreed-upon group utility function
u :2 K → R, where u(ω) is the (possibly negative) utility gain in state ω of having
chosen “Yes” rather than “No”. A given utility function u induces the decision
function Φu, with




Of particular interest are utility functions of the form u =1 S −τ,where S is an event
in 2K; in this case, the decision function Φ(1S−τ) simpliﬁes to
Φ(1S−τ) (p)=1if and only if p(S) >τ.
That is, the decision is “Yes” if and only if the group assessment of the event S
exceeds some threshold value τ. An aggregation rule H is Pareto consistent with










whenever Φu (pi)=1(respectively =0 )for all i ∈ I. Note the key role of epistemic
independence in making the outcome decision uniquely determined by the beliefs over
the marginal events Ek.
One can now ask, in complete analogy to the questions at the heart of sections
3 to 5, which aggregation rules H are Pareto consistent for a given u, and, second,
whether for given u there exist aggregation rules with speciﬁed desirable properties at
all. It is likely going to be substantially harder to solve these questions than before,
since the class of component aggregation rules Hk :[ 0 ,1]I → [0,1] is obviously much
larger than the class of rules Fk : {0,1}I → {0,1}, and a counterpart to the Pareto
Intersection Property seems unlikely to exist.
Pareto consistency becomes an issue already in the simplest of problems, for exam-
ple in a Bayesian counterpart to the classical conjunction problem.
27Example 13 Suppose two expected-value maximizing agents share the proﬁts from
a potential investment equally. The success of this investment depends on the joint
realization of two independent events E1 and E2. The investment is successful if
and only if both materialize; in this case, the investment recoups the initial outlays
tenfold; in the alternative, it is completely wasted. Thus we have u =1 S − τ, where
S = E1 ∩ E2 = {(1,1)} and τ = 1
10.
Consider now the following proﬁle of probability judgments illustrated in table 1
below. Agent 1 believes that the ﬁrst contingency will materialize with 90% probability,
but the second only with 10% probability; the investment will therefore succeed with
9% probability, implying a negative expected return. Agent 2 likewise believes that the
investment will succeed with 9% probability, but for diﬀerent reasons. While she thinks
that the second contingency will materialize with 90% probability, she gives only a 10
%c h a n c et ot h eﬁrst.
By contrast, aggregating the probability judgments for the two contingencies directly
suggests a group probability of 50% for each in view of the symmetry of the individual
90% and 10%=100%-90% estimates. (A natural aggregation rule Hk to deliver this
besides the arithmetic mean rule, and one that is arguably more attractive, is to let
the group odds ratio for event Ek against Ec
k be the geometric mean of the individual
odds ratios.) This entails a 25% probability for the investment to succeed, hence a
clear decision to invest.
p1 (E1) p2 (E2) p(E1 ∩ E2) Decision
Agent 1 0.9 0.1 0.09 Don’t Invest
Agent 2 0.1 0.9 0.09 Don’t Invest
Group {1,2} 0.5 0.5 0.25 Invest
Table 3: A Bayesian Version of the Paretian Dilemma
The example illustrates that well-motivated aggregation rules H can be Pareto
inconsistent, just as the premise-wise majority rule was in the original Paretian
Dilemma. Just as in that case, we do not claim that this is the only reasonable
aggregation rule, nor that the Paretian Dilemma cannot be avoided by choice of a
28diﬀerent rule. Indeed, in this particular example Pareto consistency could be achieved
for instance by letting the group probability be the geometric mean of individual
















Note that at the proﬁle given in Table 4, this leads to group probabilities of 30% for
each contingency, and thus 9% for the investment to succeed. 25
But serependipity cannot always succeed in the case of decisions based on more
complex events. This follows from the following Proposition.
Proposition 14 There exist events S such that no anonymous separable aggregation
rule H is Pareto consistent with Φ(1S−τ), for any τ ∈ (0,1).
Proposition 14 is veriﬁed by constructing an example with 6 marginal events, setting
S =( E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E3 ∩ E4) ∪ (E5 ∩ E6), a probability threshold τ ∈ (0,1) and two




Judge\Event E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 S Decision
I α α β β β β α2 +2 β
2 Yes
II β β α α β β α2 +2 β
2 Yes










25A potential criticism of this aggregation rule is its asymmetric treatment of the positive and
negative realizations of the contingencies; for example, due to this asymmetry, this aggregation rule
would fail to be Pareto consistent for decision problems of the form Φ(1S−τ) if S is a disjunction
rather than conjunction of two independent events.
We note that with only two independent events and an odd number of agents, the latter problem
can be overcome in turn by using instead the event-wise median of the individual probabilities. This
follows from results of Peters et al. (1992) . On the other hand, the median is Pareto inconsistent
if E is the conjunction of more than two events, as can be seen by interpreting Example associated
with Table 1 in the introduction probabilistically.
29Judge\Event E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 S Decision
I α β β α β β 2αβ + β
2 No
II β β α β β α 2αβ + β
2 No









Table 4: Impossibility of a Paretian Rational in the Bayesian Setting.
By anonymity and separability of H, the group probabilities p1
k on each marginal
event Ek must be the same at both proﬁles, and therefore the group decision must
be the same as well. Yet since the agents agree on a diﬀerent outcome decision at the
two proﬁles, Pareto consistency must be violated in one of them.
Connections with the Bayesian Literature While there does not seem to exist
a direct counterpart to the above observations such as Proposition 14 in the literature,
the existence of potential conﬂicts between Bayesian group rationality and the Pareto
axiom is well-known, starting with the classic contribution of Hylland-Zeckhauser
(1969). In all of these contributions, the conﬂict results from a simultaneous dis-
agreement about probabilities and utilities, in contrast to Proposition 14, where the
impossibility results from a disagreement about probabilities only.
There exists also more a directly related literature that is concerned with the purely
epistemic aggregation of probability judgments only; see in particular the classic sur-
vey by Genest and Zidek (1985). In the discussion, two aggregation rules play a dom-
inant rule, the “linear” and the “logarithmic” “opinion pools”. In the linear opinion
pool, the group probability of each event is the (possibly weighted) arithmetic aver-
age of individual probabilities; by contrast, in the logarithmic opinion pool, the group
probability of each state is proportional to the (possibly weighted) geometric average
of individual probabilities. While the linear opinion pool respects unanimous prob-
ability judgments for all events by construction, the logarithmic opinion pool does
not.26 On the other hand, the logarithmic opinion pool preserves stochastic indepen-
26In example 13, for instance, the logarithmic opinion pool yields the 25% estimate for the prob-
ability of the event E1 ∩ E2 that has been suggested heuristically above.
30dence of individual probability judgments, while the linear one does not. Neither rule
h a se m e r g e da st h ed o m i n a n to n e . 27
The main contribution of this section vis-a-vis this Bayesian literature is to show
that potential conﬂicts between reason-based judgment aggregation and the Pareto
criterion are not tied to a speciﬁc, demanding model of decision-theoretic rationality
at the group level such as the Bayesian one, but comes with the notion of reason-
based judgment aggregation as such. In particular, such conﬂicts do not depend on
the aggregation of an entire coherent preference or likelihood ordering respectively
probability measure, but arise already in the context of the simplest binary decision
problems.
7. ON THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF THE PARETO AXIOM
The results of this paper have demonstrated the great robustness of the Dilemma of
the Paretian Rational in propositional judgment aggregation and beyond. Even in the
simplest cases, it is always present as a possibility, in that some prima facie sensible
aggregation rules fail to be to consistent with the Pareto criterion. In many cases, such
failures occur even for aggregation rules that are natural and well-motivated, such as
premise-wise majority voting in the propositional case or the “geometric mean odds”
rule in the Bayesian case illustrated in Example 13. Indeed, if the group decision
problem is suﬃciently complex, the Dilemma runs deep enough so that all separable
aggregation rules are vulnerable to conﬂicts with the Pareto principle.
This raises the normative issue over which principle should give way, when neces-
sary, or how they should be qualiﬁed or traded-oﬀ against each other. As its resolution
turns out to be quite complex and touches on some controversial considerations such
as, in the Bayesian case, the normativity of the common prior assumption, unavoid-
27Obviously, the linear opinion pool could have been used to “overcome” the Pareto consistency
problem. It is not clear, however, whether such overcoming is necessary (cf. section 7) nor appropri-
ate. In particular, if individual probability measures are aggregated linearly, the group probability
of the decision-relevant event S is no longer a function of the group probabilities pk
I of the marginal
events Ek, and thus no longer grounded in them. This would appear to seriously compromise the
reason-basedness of the group choice. A more complete treatment would have to discuss the pros
and cons of the linear opinion pool from the present perspective in greater detail.
Two “parallel” axiomatizations of these aggregation rules based on separability considerations can
be found in Fishburn-Rubinstein (1986); Paretian considerations play no role there.
31ably the discussion will be somewhat rough and incomplete, and a fully satisfactory
analysis is left to future work. The more modest goal of the present discussion is to
establish the existence of a live conﬂict between the two principles. In particular, we
will argue that the “Dilemma” does not show that the notion of reason-basedness
is ill-founded from the start, and that, indeed, in some situations it is the Pareto
principle that should give way.
To ensure that the following discussion rests on a suﬃciently well-speciﬁed premises,
we will assume that all agents’ judgments are commonly known (“Complete Infor-
mation”). Thus, all deliberation has already taken place, and there is nothing left to
discuss; any remaining diﬀerence in agents’ judgments reveals an “agreement to dis-
agree” in the sense of Aumann (1976). On the one hand, the Complete Information
assumption is in line with the absence of a formally described information structure
from the model. On the other hand, under asymmetric information, unanimity of
interim judgments would fail to be the normatively appropriate Pareto requirement,
robbing the Paretian Dilemma of normative relevance for reasons that having nothing
to do with the reason-basedness of social choice28,29.
The assumption of Complete Information is not consistent with some interpreta-
tions of the judgment aggregation problem that can be found in the literature. In
particular, it rules out an evaluation of aggregation rules in terms of their truth-
tracking properties in the manner of the Condorcet Jury Theorem30, for this liter-
ature attributes the diﬀerence in rational agents’ judgments to diﬀerences in their
information.
Similarly, the assumption of Complete Information also undercuts much of the
motivation behind delegating the judgment on diﬀerent premises to diﬀerent experts
as studied in section 5. For such delegation presumably hinges on the putative experts
28To see the issue more clearly in a voting context, suppose that the agents agree that a positive
outcome decision should be taken if the probability of its "success" is suﬃciently high (= q∗), and
that this threshold probability exceeds the agents’ common prior. If the agents’ private signals are
suﬃciently weak, it may well be, that no agent would favor on the basis of his own information that
the project be undertaken, even though all agents would agree to do so once their information is
pooled .
29In a Bayesian setting, this has been argued compellingly by Holmstrom-Myerson (1983); they
propose instead a notion of Interim Pareto Dominance, which requires not just unanimity but com-
mon knowledge of unanimity.
30For works along these lines in the judgment aggregation literature, see for example Bovens-
Rabinowicz (2004) and List (2004a).
32being “better informed” than the non-experts; but under Complete Information, such
asymmetries of information are ruled out by deﬁnition.
7.1. Group Choice based on Shared Self-Interest
We will argue that the correct resolution of the conﬂict between Paretianism and
Rationalism will depend on the nature of the group choice problem. Suppose ﬁrst that
the decision at hand is a matter of shared self-interest, as in the proﬁt sharing example
above (Example 13). In that example, both agents’ interests are perfectly aligned; the
two agents merely disagree in their assessment of the underlying uncertainty. Since
under the stated assumptions both agents believe that the investment will make
negative expected proﬁts, it seems compelling to argue that the agents’ joint decision
should be to reject the investment project, in agreement with the Pareto criterion.
How solid is the case for the Pareto criterion here on reﬂection? In particular,
could one reasonably argue that the group probability derived from premise-based
aggregation, taken to be 25% here, is the “right” probability all and all from an
impartial point of view, and that the agents should base their joint decision on it?
Such an argument can be supported by appealing to the normativity of the common
prior assumption, according to which in view of Aumann’s (1976) celebrated result
disagreement among agents entails the existence of at least one imperfectly rational
agent.31
A crucial consideration here is the assumption of Complete Information. For if the
agents “agree to disagree” with each other, they will “agree to disagree” with the
reason-based group judgment as well (if that judgment diﬀers from their own) since
that judgment is a commonly known logical consequence of the individual judgments
given the aggregation rule. Thus arguing that the 25% belief is the right belief, every-
thing considered, amounts to saying that each agent, given his current information,
should have beliefs diﬀerent from those that he in fact has. This line of reasoning has
the structure of a classical paternalistic argument, according to which an overriding of
individual preferences is warranted because of rationality deﬁcits in their formation.
Opinions will diﬀer as to whether and when such paternalism is legitimate or even
31For a rejection of the Pareto criterion that appeals to the normativity of the common prior
assumption, see Gilboa et al. (2004).
33mandated. Among the arguments against paternalism and in favor of maintaining
the Pareto principle, two deserve to be mentioned in particular; we shall refer to them
as the “pluralist” and the “liberal” defenses of the Pareto principle, respectively. The
pluralist defense is simply to reject the normativity of the common prior assumption,
so that disagreement among agents is no evidence per se of agent’s irrationality,
and therefore does not motivate by itself any paternalistic overriding of the Pareto
principle 32. The liberal defense of the Pareto principle might accept the common
prior assumption as normative, but would argue that in matters of self-interest agents
should have a right to make a mistake. So, in view of these two defenses, the argument
for the Pareto criterion remains strong, and we expect that most economists would
subscribe to it, even though there will be some dissenters.
Assuming, then, that the Pareto principle is accepted in situations of (possibly
shared) self-interest, what do the results of this paper imply for the notion reason-
based group choice? One response would be to argue that “reasons” are simply
irrelevant to group choice among self-interested agents, and that the group choice
should be determined by agents’ preferences over outcomes in line with received social
choice theory via standard criteria of distributional justice, optimal voting or fair
bargaining.
But this need not be the only possible response. For example, in discussions of
deliberative democracy, it is often suggested that the ability to support collective
choices by collectively aﬃrmed reasons enhances their “legitimacy” (see, for example,
Pettit (2001a)). Presumably, considerations of legitimacy would sometimes justify
t h ec h o i c eo fa no u t c o m ef a v o r e db yam i n o r i t ya st h eb e t t e rs u p p o r t e do n e .I nt h i s
manner, reason-basedness can function as a form of minority protection. However,
there seems to be no point in overruling a unanimous “majority” on grounds of
deﬁcient legitimacy: no need for legitimation without contestation, one might say.
Thus, our impossibility results imply that a satisfactory account of reason-based social
choice as legitimizing requires a departure from the separable premise-aggregation
assumed here. The maxmin rules introduced at the end of section 4 have some
appeal as “legitimizing” aggregation rules; their separability failure may be — would
have to be — a price worth paying.
32See Morris (1995), for example, for a forceful critique of the common prior assumption.
347.2. Group Choice based on Shared Responsibility
Are there situations in which the Pareto axiom lacks normative force even though
the premises of these defenses are accepted? We will now try to show that there
are indeed such situations, and the Pareto principle does not apply when the group
decision is one of “shared responsibility” rather than “shared self-interest”.
To illustrate the idea, suppose that the above proﬁt-sharing example is modiﬁed
so that now the two agents are trustees of a fund that has been endowed for the
beneﬁto fa nu n d e r - a g eh e i r .I nc o n t r a s tt oap r o ﬁt-sharing example, the members of
the group have now no (legitimate) personal stake in the decision. Their judgments
merely serve as informational inputs from which the group decision is to be derived
in an appropriate way; this implies in particular that the individuals’ own preferences
over outcomes carry no normative weight on their own. In particular, unanimity of
individual “preferences” qua preferences does not normatively entail a corresponding
group preference, which is to say that the Pareto principle is normatively defeasible
in principle.
Yet it would be rash to conclude from this argument alone that the Pareto principle
can in fact be legitimately violated, for it might be supported indirectly through what
may be called the “Unanimity Principle”. By “Unanimity Principle”, we mean the
requirement that the group judgement on any particular proposition or event must
agree with the individual judgments on this proposition or event whenever these are
unanimous. While the Pareto Principle is concerned with the socially rational choice
of outcomes, the Unanimity Principle is concerned with the socially rational aggre-
gation of judgments qua judgments, irrespective of their outcome implications. In
the introductory adjudication example, for instance, the Unanimity principle asserts
that a unanimous negation of the conjunctive proposition (“had duty and was neg-
ligent and conduct was causal”) obliges the panel to render the same judgment on
this proposition; by the assumed agreed-upon content of legal doctrine this judgment
“happens to” entail a negative outcome decision on the damages; in this way, the
Unanimity Principle may lend indirect support for the Pareto Principle. Similarly,
in the Bayesian investment example, the Unanimity principle would imply that the
g r o u pm u s ta s s i g na9 %p r o b a b i l i t yt ot h ec o n j o i n te v e n tE1 ∩ E2, which, as a re-
sult of the shared utility-function over ﬁnal outcomes, would entail a rejection of the
35investment project.
We now argue that the Unanimity Principle should not be considered a general
principle of the rational judgment aggregation. In particular, we submit that the
Unanimity Principle does not hold in cases in which the premise judgments are epis-
temically independent and prior to the conclusion. (In the case of propositional judg-
ment aggregation, epistemic independence has already been brieﬂy discussed above;
in the Bayesian case, epistemic independence can be identiﬁed with stochastic inde-
pendence.)33
If premises are epistemically independent and thus prior to the conclusion, all
relevant information about the outcome decision is contained in the agents’ premise
judgments; their outcome judgements make thus no independent contribution, and
should arguably not carry any independent weight. Hence if the group aggregation
rule entails an outcome judgment that contradicts the unanimous outcome judgment
of the agents, this contradiction by itself is no reason to doubt the wisdom of the
aggregation rule. Indeed, under epistemic independence of premises it is easy to
understand how a group aggregation rule can rightly override a unanimous outcome
judgment: for while the latter depends crucially on how the judgments on diﬀerent
premises are “correlated” across agents, such correlation arguably should not matter
given the assumed epistemic independence.34
It is worth emphasizing that while the argument against in the Unanimity Principle
is particularly strong under epistemic independence of the premises, its validity is not
conﬁned to this case. Indeed, the Unanimity Principle seems to be open to justiﬁable
violations quite generally as long as there is some evidential spillover from other,
33Arguably, the former entails the latter: if premises are epistemically independent, they must be
viewed as epistemically prior to the entailed outcome judgments. For instance, arguing by modus
tollens, if in the Bayesian investment example some agent had evidence for the likelihood of the
conjoint event E1 ∩ E2 that is not derived from direct evidence on the underlying events E1 and
E2 (for example based on the track record of similar earlier investment decisions), this should be
reﬂected in a negative subjective correlation between the marginal events E1 and E2 in his probability
judgments, in contradiction to the assumed subjective independence between them.
34This argument seems cogent if agents are assumed to be fully rational. If not, there may be
room for learning about the likely rationality departures of an agent’s judgement on some premise
from his judgement pattern on other premises compared to that of the other agents. Since the point
of our argument here is merely to claim that the Unanimity Principle is sometimes defeasible, we
leave this stone unturned.
36related judgments.
To fully understand the diﬀerence between situations of shared interests and situa-
tions of shared responsibility, it is instructive to compare the role of the pluralist and
liberal defenses of the Pareto criterion in both contexts. Since both defenses pertain
to the propositional or probabilistic judgments underlying agents’ preferences, they
can be applied as meaningfully to the Unanimity principle as to the Pareto principle.
However, in situations of shared responsibility, they lose plausibility or force. The
breakdown of the liberal defense is straightforward, in that it is part and parcel of
the very notion of responsibility that agents are not simply free to make mistakes in
their exercise of such responsibility.
The breakdown of the pluralist defense is more subtle. In contrast to situations of
shared interest, in situations of shared responsibility the normative underwriting of a
group judgment that diﬀers from the unanimous judgement of individual agents does
not mean that the agents’ are paternalized in the sense that their belief is replaced by
a normatively superior one. Instead, the aggregate belief should now be thought of
as belonging to “the group”, as distinct from the individual agents; it is normatively
valid as an “optimal” summary of the information contained in individual judgments
for the purposes of coming to the best-justiﬁed collective decision. The group has
to be thought of as epistemically in a position diﬀerent from any individual (neither
superior nor inferior) in virtue of its impartial (agent-neutral) vantage point; claiming
that a particular belief is best for the group does therefore not entail that it must be
best for any agent individually,.
A Paradox of Responsible Choice ?.–
The notion of a distinct group belief suggests the following normative implication.
Suppose that only one of the two agents is tasked with the investment decision as
the single trustee while the other is merely an outside onlooker. Then arguably the
single trustee agent would rightly discharge his responsibility to the heir by basing
the decision on his own best estimate of the success of the project, in this case with
the consequence of not undertaking the investment decision.35
35Note that if one was to argue that the individual would be obliged to take an impartial viewpoint
towards his own beliefs in discharging his responsibility, this viewpoint would hardly coincide with
37There is an element of paradox here, in that the responsible decision for a group
may diﬀer from what responsibility would require of each member acting individually.
Note that it is not possible to resolve this diﬀerence by claiming that the group
has diﬀerent information from the individuals; after all, everything is assumed to
be commonly known here. Instead, it appears that a resolution of this apparent
paradox must involve the notion that being held (or holding oneself) responsible as a
group engenders a group agency that cannot be reduced directly to the agency of the
underlying individuals — which is very much in line with the rationale for introducing
the notion of a group belief in the ﬁrst place 36.
8. CONCLUSION: SOME DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The results of this paper have demonstrated the existence of a robust tension be-
tween reason-based choice and the Pareto principle. In the speciﬁc propositional
framework assumed in the bulk of the paper, this tension becomes in fact a stark
conﬂict in that under all but the simplest decision functions, this conﬂict is unavoid-
able. Future research should explore the robustness of our ﬁndings under diﬀerent
assumptions, especially diﬀerent assumptions on the structure of the judgments to be
aggregated. Our preliminary observations in section 6, however, suggest already that
the overall bottom line is likely to generalize, and that at best only rather special
premise aggregation rules will agree with the Pareto principle.
We have also probed into the normative implications of this conﬂict, and identi-
ﬁed circumstances that render the Pareto principle either normative compelling or
defeasible, characterizing them in terms of “shared self-interest” versus “shared re-
sponsibility”. In contexts of shared self-interest, the articulation of reasons for a
collective choice may still play a role, for example in legitimizing group decisions.
However, these reasons will need to relate to the group decision in fairly restricted
ways so as not to fall prey to the Paretian Dilemma. We have given here just one
that of the group, since the group will have onlookers to. The viewpoint would have to be that of
“all” rational believers, but who are these “all”?
36The connection between reason-based social choice and non-reducible group agency is central
to the work of Pettit; see in particular Pettit (2001b). While Pettit does not appeal to the notion
of “shared responsibility” as it is used here, there is probably a non-trivial degree of overlap that
remains to be clariﬁed.
38e x a m p l e( t h em i n m a xr u l e s )o fh o wt h i sm i g ht be done. Almost everything remains
to be done.
There also clearly needs to be more work trying to establish their proper underly-
ing conceptual structure and valid reach of the notion of shared responsibility. For
example, what kind of entities can the group be meaningfully responsible to? Do
these need to consist of one ore more human beings, or could it be entities such as
“our organization”, “the state” or even “the biosphere”? How should one conceptual-
ize mixed situations in which agents share a common responsibility, but self-interest
plays a legitimate role as well? These and many other interesting questions remain
to be answered.
39APPENDIX
A1. An Irrelevance Result for Multi-valued Logics
A multi-valued aggregation rule G maps proﬁles of judgments (Ji) to multi-valued
truth assignments t =( tk); it is separable if G =( Gk), where Gk : {0,1}I → [0,1]
is monotone and respects unanimity (Gk (∅)=0 ,G k (I)=1 ) . A decision function
Φτ :[ 0 ,1]K → {0,1} makes the social choice dependent on the continuous truth value
of the proposition Φ, w h i c hi nt u r ni sd e t e r m i n e df r o mt h et r u t hv a l u e so ft h ep r e m i s e s
on the basis of an appropriate multi-valued logic. Pareto consistency is deﬁned as
before via the induced (two-valued) social choice function Φτ ◦G : {0,1}K×I → {0,1}.
According to standard axiomatizations of multi-valued logic, the truth-value of
a conjunction of propositions is equal to the minimum of the truth values of its
constituents, and the truth value of a disjunction equal to the maximum of the truth-
values of its constituents; this holds, for example, for Łukasiewicz’s logic adopted in
van Hees (2004) and for standard versions of fuzzy logic due to Zadeh (1965). Thus, in
view of the canonical disjunctive representation of monotone propositions, the truth
























where τ ∈ (0,1) is an appropriate “truth threshhold”.
While multi-valued group judgments capture the disagreement among agents in
a direct and natural way, they do not expand the set of reason-based social choice
functions, and therefore do nothing to overcome Pareto inconsistencies.
Proposition 15 Let G =( Gk) be any separable multi-valued aggregation rule, Φ any
monotone proposition and τ ∈ (0,1). Then there exists a separable aggregation rule
40F =( Fk) such that
Φτ ◦ G = Φ ◦ F.
This aggregation rule F =( Fk) is simply given by by accepting premise k at those
proﬁles at which the truth-value of that premise under G exceeds the critical threshold
τ; formally, set Fk (W)=1if and only if Gk (W) >τfor W ∈ 2I and k ≤ K.F o r
example, if the degree of truth tk at a proﬁle is given by the fraction of agents aﬃrming
premise k, than Fk is a quota-rule with quota τ.
Proposition 15 is formally proved as follows. For any proﬁle (Ji), Φτ ◦G((Ji)) = 1
if and only if maxm∈M+ mink∈J+
m Gk ((Ji)) >τ ,i.e. iﬀ there exists m ∈ M+ such
that, for all k ∈ J+
m,G k ((Ji)) >τ ,i.e. iﬀ there exists m ∈ M+ such that, for all
k ∈ J+
m,F k ((Ji)) = k. B u tt h i si se q u i v a l e n tt os a y i n gt h a tF ((Ji)) ∈ J +,t h a ti s
Φ ◦ F ((Ji)) = 1.
41A.2 Proofs
The following Fact establishes that the families of winning coalitions Wk and W0
k
are dual to each other; it will be referenced repeatedly in the following proofs; see NP
for the straightforward veriﬁcation.
Fact 16 W0
k = {W ∈ 2I :for all W0 ∈ Wk : W ∩ W0 6= ∅};
Wk = {W ∈ 2I :for all W0 ∈ W0
k : W ∩ W0 6= ∅}.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
F =( Wk)k∈K is Pareto consistent iﬀ
i) for all proﬁles (Ji) such that {Ji} ⊆ J −,F((Ji)) ∈ J −, and likewise
ii) for all proﬁles (Ji) such that {Ji} ⊆ J +,F((Ji)) ∈ J +.
Thus i) and ii) deﬁne the consistency of the aggregation rules (Wk)k∈K on the
restricted domains J − resp. J +. These have been characterized in NP, Theorem 3.
For k ∈ K, let Hk := {J ∈ J −:J 3 k}, and let H− := {Hk}k∈K ∪ {Hc
k}k∈K.
A complement-free family G ⊆ H
− is a (non-trivial) critical family if ∩G = ∅ and
∩G∈G (G\G) 6= ∅. It is easily veriﬁed that the critical families are exactly the families
of the form {{Hk}k∈J+
m}, where J+
m ∈ J +. Thus, by NP, Theorem 3, F|(J −)
I is
consistent iﬀ part i) of the Proposition is satisﬁed. Likewise, F|(J +)
I is consistent iﬀ
part ii) of the Proposition is satisﬁed. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 .
As in the proof of Proposition 2, F =( Wk)k∈K is Pareto consistent iﬀ
i) for all proﬁles (Ji) such that {Ji} ⊆ J −,F((Ji)) ∈ J −, and likewise
ii) for all proﬁles (Ji) such that {Ji} ⊆ J +,F((Ji)) ∈ J +.
By Theorem 4 of NP, these two conditions hold for some (or for any) neutral and
non-dictatorial separable aggregation rule if and only if the associated critical families
have cardinality 2, i.e. in view of the argument in the proof of Proposition 2, if and
only if κΦ =2 . This establishes the equivalence of 1), 2) and 3).
As to the equivalence between 3) and 4), one veriﬁes the implication 4) ⇒ 3)
by inspecting the canonical representation of ¬Φ in each case. We will show by
42contradiction that κΦ =2implies n ≤ 5. The remaining claim follows “by hand”
from similarly straightforward but tedious arguments that are omitted.
Suppose, thus, that κΦ =2and that n ≥ 5.
Lemma 17 J ∈ J + iﬀ for all J0 ∈ J − (or J0 ∈ maxJ −),J∩ (J0)
c 6= ∅.
J ∈ J − iﬀ for all J0 ∈ J + (or J0 ∈ minJ +),J 0 ∩ Jc 6= ∅.
Veriﬁcation. J ∈ J + iﬀ not J ⊆ J0 for some J0 ∈ maxJ − iﬀ, for all J0 ∈ maxJ −,
not J ⊆ J0, i.e. iﬀ for all J0 ∈ maxJ −,J∩(J0)
c 6= ∅. The second part is completely
analogous. ¤
Lemma 18 For all j, there exists J ∈ minJ + such that j ∈ J and there exists
J0 ∈ maxJ − such that j ∈ (J0)
c .
Veriﬁcation. Suppose, contrary to the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ec l a i m ,t h a tf o ra l lJ ∈
minJ +,j/ ∈ J. Then, by Lemma 17, for any S, S ∈ J − iﬀ S\j ∈ J −, i.e. j is
inessential. Again, the second part is completely analogous. ¤
Since n ≥ 5, in view of Lemma 18, minJ + must contain at least two disjoint sets
J,J0. For if this was not the case, clearly minJ + must be of the form {{a ,a k}}k∈K\ ,
in which case maxJ − = {{a },{ak}k∈K\ }, which implies κΦ ≥ 3.
Thus minJ + contains three sets of the form
{a1,a 2},{a3,a 4},{a5,a  }, (7)
where w.l.o.g.   =1or   =6 . Evidently {a1} ∈ J −, since {a1,a 2} ∈ minJ +.
Let J denote any element of maxJ − containing {a1}. By Lemma 17, Jc must
intersect all elements of minJ +, which implies
J
c 3 a2,J
c ∩ {a3,a 4} 6= ∅ and J
c ∩ {a5,a  } 6= ∅.
Hence #Jc ≥ 3, contradicting the assumption that κΦ =2 . It follows that in fact
n ≤ 4 ¥
P r o o fo fF a c t6 .
43Consider a decomposable Φ with ak entailing Φ. Then evidently {k} ∈ minJ +, and
therefore, for all other J in minJ +,k/ ∈ J. Thus no other conjunct in the canonical
representation of Φ contains ak, which means that Φ(a1,...,a n)=Φ0(a1,..,ak−1,a k+1,..,an)∨
ak.
The dual case of Φ entailing ak is analogous. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 .
Part i). Step 1: Pareto consistency implies Neutrality
Suppose that F given by (Wk)k∈K is Pareto consistent.
Let D denote a linear ordering on 22I that is monotone with respect to set inclusion,
i.e. such that W ⊇ W0 implies W D W0, with asymmetric component B, and partition
the set of atomic propositions K into three subsets K=,K>, and K< as follows:
K
= = {k : Wk = W
0
k},K
> = {k : Wk B W
0
k},K
< = {k : Wk C W
0
k}.
We need the following Lemmata.
Lemma 19 For any two committees W B W
0,a n dW0 D (W0)
0 , there exist W ∈ W
and W0 ∈ W0 such that W ∩ W0 = ∅.
Proof. Suppose not. I.e., for all W ∈ W and W0 ∈ W0 : W ∩ W0 6= ∅.













Lemma 20 For any j,k and J such that {j,k} ⊆ J ∈ minJ + or {j,k} ⊆ Jc and
J ∈ minJ −,j∈ K> if and only if k ∈ K<.
44This follows immediately from Lemma 19 and the PIP. ¤
To complete the proof of Step 1, in view of Proposition 12 of section 5 (demonstrated
below), it suﬃces to show that K> ∪ K< = ∅.
First, we note that K> ∈ J −. Indeed, suppose that instead K> ∈ J +. Then there
exists J ⊆ K> such that J ∈ minJ +. But since #J ≥ 2 by indecomposability, this
contradicts Lemma 20.
Second, we verify that indeed K>∪K< ∈ J −. Let L denote any superset of K> in
maxJ −. Since by construction Lc ⊆ K= ∪ K< and #Lc ≥ 2 by indecomposability,
Lc ⊆ K= by Lemma 20, i.e. L ⊇ K>∪K<, from which the claim follows immediately.
Finally, we show that K> ∪ K< = ∅. If this was not the case, then by indecom-
posability and Lemma 20, K> 6= ∅.F i x a n y k ∈ K>. By Lemma 18, there exists
J ∈ minJ + containing k with #J ≥ 2.S i n c eJ * K> ∪ K< by the previous claim,
J ∩ K= 6= ∅ , in contradiction to Lemma 20.
Step 2: If F is eﬃcient and neutral, κΦ ≤ 2.
Step 3: If neutral and κΦ ≤ 2, then F is eﬃcient.
The last two steps follow immediately from Theorem 5. ¤
Part ii).
Deﬁne quotas (qk) as follows: If in the canonical decomposition ak appears in a
disjunction, let qk = 1
2k. If, on the other hand, ak appears in a conjunction, let
qk =1− 1
(2+ )k, where   is any irrational strictly positive number.
We claim by induction on K that
i) for any J ∈ minJ +,
P
k∈J qk ≥ #J − 1+ 1
(2+ )k,
ii) for any J ∈ maxJ −,
P
k∈Jc qk ≤ 1 − 1
(2+ )k.
By Fact 3, this implies that (Wqk) is Pareto consistent.
Suppose that our claim holds for K.T h e nw ew i l ls h o wf r o mt h er e c u r s i v ec h a r -
acterization of critical sets given by the following Lemma 21 that the claim holds in
fact for K +1 .
45Lemma 21 a) Let Φ0(a1,...,a K+1)=Φ(a1,...,aK) ∨ aK+1 with associated sets J −0
and J +0. Then
maxJ








b) Let Φ0(a1,...,aK+1)=Φ(a1,...,aK)∧aK+1 with associated sets J −0 and J +0. Then
maxJ
−0 = {J ∪ {aK+1} : J ∈ maxJ
−} ∪ {a1,...,a K}, and
minJ
+0 = {J ∪ {aK+1} : J ∈ minJ
+}.
The proof of the Lemma is straightforward, hence omitted.
To verify the inductive argument, consider the case in which Φ0(a1,...,aK+1)=
Φ(a1,...,aK) ∧ aK+1; the alternative case of Φ0(a1,...,aK+1)=Φ(a1,...,aK) ∨ aK+1 is
veriﬁed analogously. Consider J ∈ maxJ −0. If J = {a1,...,aK},J c = {aK+1}, and
thus X
k∈Jc
qk = qK+1 =1−
1
(2 +  )
K+1.






qk ≤ 1 −
1
(2 +  )
K ≤ 1 −
1
(2 +  )
K+1.
On the other hand, consider J ∈ minJ +0. Then J = J0 ∪ {aK+1} for some J0 ∈






















(2 +  )
K+1.
Part iii).
Deﬁne quotas (qk) as follows: If ak is a core-premise (i.e. if k ≤ km − 1), set
qk = 1
2.I fak is a non-core premise and appears in the canonical decomposition in a
disjunction, set qk =0 . If, on the other hand, ak appears in a conjunction, set qk =1 .
46We claim by induction on the number of non-core premises K − km +1that
i) for any J ∈ minJ +,
P
k∈J qk ≥ #J − 1,
ii) for any J ∈ maxJ −,
P
k∈Jc qk ≤ 1.
By Fact 3, this implies that (Wqk) is Pareto consistent. The remaining proof
parallels that of Part ii) exactly.
B yT h e o r e m5 ,t h ec l a i mh o l d si fK − km +1=0 . Suppose that our claim holds
for K − km +1 =L. W en e e dt os h o wt h a ti th o l d si nf a c tf o rL +1as well.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hΦ0(a1,...,aL+1)=Φ(a1,...,aL)∧aL+1; the alternative case
of Φ0(a1,...,a L+1)=Φ(a1,...,aL)∨aL+1 is veriﬁed analogously. Consider J ∈ maxJ −0.
If J = {a1,...,aL}, X
k∈Jc
qk = qL+1 =1 .







On the other hand, consider J ∈ minJ +0. Then J = J0 ∪ {aL+1} for some J0 ∈






qk + qL+1 ≥ (#J − 2) + 1 = #J − 1.
This proves the existence of anonymous separable aggregation rules that are Pareto
consistent.
Conversely, take any Pareto consistent separable aggregation rule F =( Wk). By
Lemma 21, there exists a critical set J ∈ minJ + such that J contains at least two
core and at least one non-core premises, or there exists a critical set J ∈ maxJ −
such that Jc contains at least two core and at least one non-core premises. Assume
w.l.o.g. the former, with J ⊇ {j1,j 2, }, where j1 and j2 a r ec o r ep r e m i s e sa n d  is a
non-core premise.
47By relativizing the critical sets to core premises and applying the argument behind
Part i), (Wk) must be neutral on core premises. Hence in particular
Wj1 = W
0
j1 = Wj2. (8)
Fix any W and i ∈ W such that W ∈ Wj1 while W\i/ ∈ Wj1, hence Wc∪{i} ∈ W0
j1.
By (8), Wc ∪ {i} ∈ Wj2. By the PIP therefore, for all W0 ∈ W ,
W ∩ (W
c ∪ {i}) ∩ W
0 = {i} ∩ W
0 6= ∅.
By Fact 16 this implies that {i} ∈ W0
 , which means that i has veto power against
a .
We note that further reasoning along these lines shows that there is a unique
anonymous separable aggregation rule that ensures Pareto consistency. This rule
consists of majority voting on core premises combined with unanimity voting on non-
core premises or their negations.
Part iv).
By a construction analogous to that of Part iii) in which majority voting on core
premises is replaced by dictatorship on core premises, one demonstrates the existence
of non-dictatorial Pareto consistent separable aggregation rules
Conversely, it is immediate from the neutrality on core premises established in Part
iii) that any Pareto consistent separable aggregation rule must be dictatorial on core
premises, hence locally dictatorial. ¥
Proof of Theorem 10.
We need the following lemmas.
Lemma 22 For any monotone Φ : For all j,k ∈ K, at least one of the following
statements holds:
1. there exists J ∈ minJ + such that {j,k} ⊆ J;
2. there exists J ∈ maxJ − such that {j,k} ⊆ Jc;
483. there exists J ∈ minJ +,J 0 ∈ maxJ − and  / ∈ {j,k} such that {j, } ⊆ J and
such that {k, } ⊆ Jc.
Proof. Fix j,k ∈ K. By Lemma 18, there exist J ∈ minJ + and J0 ∈ maxJ −
such that j ∈ J and k/ ∈ J0.B y L e m m a 1 7 ,J∩ (J0)
c 6= ∅.L e t   ∈ J ∩ (J0)
c.I f
neither (1) nor (2) is satisﬁed, then  / ∈ {j,k}, whence (3) is satisﬁed. ¤
Lemma 23 Let F be Pareto consistent and separable w.r.t. the monotone proposition
Φ.T h e n ,f o ra l lj,k ∈ K, Wj ⊇ Wk, Wj ⊇ W0
k, W0
j ⊇ Wk, or W0
j ⊇ W0
k.
Take any j,k ∈ K, and consider in turn the three cases described by Lemma 22.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sJ ∈ minJ + such that {j,k} ⊆ J. In this case, by the
PIP, for all W ∈ Wj and W0 ∈ Wk,W∩ W0 6= ∅. By Fact 16, therefore W0
j ⊇ Wk.
Similarly, if there exists J ∈ maxJ − such that {j,k} ⊆ Jc, one infers that
Wj ⊇ W0
k.
Finally, suppose that there exists J ∈ minJ +,J 0 ∈ maxJ − and  / ∈ {j,k} such
that {j, } ⊆ J a n ds u c ht h a t {k, } ⊆ Jc. By what we have just shown for the
ﬁrst case, W0
j ⊇ W . Likewise, by what we have just shown for the second case,
W  ⊇ W0
k. Hence by transitivity of set inclusion, W0
j ⊇ W0
k. ¤
The Theorem is now an immediate result of Lemma 23 and the deﬁnition of
Dj. ¥
Proof of Proposition 12.
Note that premise-wise neutrality implies that, for all k,Dk = Wk = W0
k. Hence,
by Fact 16, Theorem 10 implies that, for all j,k ∈ K, W0
j ⊇ Wk and W0
k ⊇ Wj, and
thus by premise-wise neutrality again Wj = Wk. ¤
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